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GRENADA, NICARAGUA AND PANAMA:
TRACKING FORCE-FOR-DEMOCRACY
DISCOURSE IN THE 1980s
Craig Scott
One can no longer simply condemn externally motivated actions
aimed at removing an 
the consultation or implementation of the popular will per
se violations of sovereignty without inquiring whether and under
what conditions that will was being expressed, and how the external
action will affect the expression and 
sovereignty.. ... No one is entitled to complain that things are getting
too complicated. ... Those who yearn for ' the good old days ' and
continue to trumpet terms like ' sovereignty' without relating them
to the human rights conditions within the states under discussion
. do more than commit an 
rights.
Michael Reisman
, "
Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law" (1991) 84 ATIL 866.
If we want to take human rights seriously, we cannot give much
weight to conspiracies among ruling elites that do not represent
the views of their populations. ... (NJo intervention treaties invented
by (elites) for their own self-interest ... do not constitute real rules
of , but, rather are quasi-rules, invented by
ruling elites to insulate 
challenge.
Anthony D' Amato
, "
The Invasion of Panama Was
a Lawful Response to Tyranny" (1990) 84 ATIL 516,
A~sistant Professor of Law, University of Toronto. This paper was
presented at the Twentieth Annual Conference ofthe Canadian Council on
International Law, entitled "Canada and the Americas , held in Ottawa from
October17 to 19 , 1991.
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I. 
I intend to address the issue of the forcible imposition or coercion
of democracy in the Americas , what commentators have called var-
iously "pro-democratic invasion , 1 "democracy promotion by inva-
sion ,2 "democracy promotion by intimidation"J and, generically,
democracy by force . 4 
I will be concerned simply 
by the United States in Central America and the Caribbean Basin as
paradigm illustrations ofthe ideologized use of force during a time
period which we increasingly are tending to call the old world order.
My reason for doing so is my view that, while these actions took
place during the so-called old world order, the perpetrators ofthese
acts are inclined to view these acts as normative harbingers 
world order, the legitimacy of which they would like to see fixed as
part of the internationallegallandscape.
This paper is a preliminary and partial treatment of the above
phenomena, In future work, I would hope to respond to the views
O. Schachter
, "
The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion" (1984) 78
AJIL 645: implicitly discussing the invasion of Grenada in 1983 by the
United States and a nominal , in
response to W. M. Reisman
, "
Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing
Charter Article 2(4)" (1984) 78 AJIL 642.
L. Whitehead
,
The Imposition of Democracy" in A. F.Lowenthal, ed.
Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America Themes and
Issues (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) 216 at 226: on the
December 1989 invasion of Panama by the United 
Exporting Democracy).
Whitehead ibid. at 231 : on United States support 
for the contras in a low-attrition war against Nicaragua, mixed with direct
CIA action such as the mining of the port of Corinto.
T. H. Carothers
, "
The Reagan Years: The 1980s" in Lowenthal Export-
ing Democracy, supra note 2 90 at 101: on both Grenada and Nicaragua. See
aIso T. H. Carothers In the Name of Democracy: u.s. 
America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1991) at
77- 116.
See the two opening quotations of Reisman and D' Amato.
.;I!
Textes choisis en droit international 171
of Michael Reisman in two editorial 
Journal ofInternational Law as well as other of 
In that context, I would seek to compare the use of military force
by the United States in the 
the time of this conference) developments in Haiti. My inclination
is to see the response 
(OAS) to the coup against President Aristide as a watershed oppor-
tunity to usher in the beginnings of a different regional order and to
show by example one direction a new world order can begin to take
- an opportunity that, it seems to me, the recent War in the 
and large squandered.7 I tend 
old and new orders can be conceived, if somewhat sloganistically,
in terms of institutional, normative and attitudinal emphasis on
judgment by force, on the one (older) hand, and on the force of
judgment, on the other (newer) hand.
My view at this 
fundamental realignment in th~ ways use of force and human rights
discourse interact, to the extent that the 
in question is the particular one of "representative democracy
See W. M. Reisman
, "
Sovereignty and Human Rights supra (first
opening quotation) and W. M. Reisman
, "
Coercion and Se1f-Detennination
supra note 1. See also W. M. Reisman
, "
Some Lessons from Iraq: Interna-
tional Law and Democratic Politics" (1991) 16 Yale J. Int' l L. 203.
B. H. Weston
, "
Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf
Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy" (1991) 85 AJIL 516; R. A. Falk
What Was the Gulf " (August 8, 1991)
(unpublished lecture while OlafPalme lecturer); R. A. Falk
, "
Reflections on
the Gulf War Experience: Force and War in the United Nations System
(May 28 , 1991) (unpublished lecture while OlafPalme lecturer); D. D. Caron
Iraq and the Force of Law: Why Give a Shield ofImmunity?" (1991) 85
AJIL 89 479.
Although this is outside the scope of this paper, I would leave open the
possibility that a new world order s United Nations could sanction multi-
lateral intervention in situations of the most serious systematic human rights
abuses such as genocide (as in Cambodia) or mass executions (Uganda): see
Development of Measures to Prevent and Intervene Against Genocide
Through International Co-operation Within the Fraplework of Competent
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I am willing, indeed happy, to concede that democracy or internal
self-determination may now , at least, may soon 
considered a ,binding human rights 
looked at ITom another angle, an evolving qualitative condition on
the "government" criterion for statehood.9 However, I expect to
advocate a 
, reason-giving
and decision-making process (and not simply an ex post facto
exercise of judgment by the international community ) with an
International Bodies Such As the United Nations , Draft resolution adopted
without a vote by the Self Governing Territories and
Ethnic Questions, 86th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, CONF/86/4-DR.18
(12 October 1991) (subsequently adopted as a resolution without a vote by
the Inter-Parliamentary Conference). However, absent explicit restructuring
of the United Nations Charter (or collectively endorsed reinterpretation ofit)
to allow for this possibility and to prevent vetoes by one state or a very small
. minority of states , arguments for lawful unilateral intervention (including,
indeed especially, intervention which is collective although outside the direct
purview of a stalemated UN) must be considered as legal questions, no less
than commentators like Ian Brownlie would consider them as moral ques-
tions: see I. Brownlie
, "
Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen" in R. B. Lillich
ed. Humanitarian Intervention and the United (Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1973) 139.
The concession is primarily for sake of argument, but also because it
does indeed seem that this is one nonnative direction that the late 20th
century world is rapidly taking. This is nowhere more clearly the case than
in the Americas. See, for example, the recent OAS 
Resolution of June 5 , 1991 , entitled "Representative Democracy" and also
the Preamble , Article 2 and Article 3 in the OAS Charter which fonn the
basis for the attention in the American system to representative democracy.
See also the references in the recent October 2
, 1991 , Minister of Foreign
Affairs resolution on Haiti to the Commitment of Santiago to Democracy and
the Renewal of the Inter-American System. Note should also be taken ofthe
.t.:ecent 
missions in countries such as Nicaragua, El Salvador, Paraguay, Surinam and
crucially, Haiti. The author participated in the OAS' election observation
missions to Nicaragua in 1990 and to EI Salvador in 1991.
10 On 
community of judgment", see
O. Schachter
, "
Self-Defense and the Rule of Law , (1989) 83 AJIL 259
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almost irrebuttable normative presumption against even the multi-
lateral use of military force following an anti-democratic coup.
This position may strike some as being highly traditional, unimag-
inative and dinosaur-like for a person of my relative youth. Perhaps
so. Yet, to go to the heart of the matter, I want to resist strenuously
what I perceive to be a 
the idea of force and the force of ideas in these euphoric times. 12 I
will be concerned to argue that a truly New World Order would treat
Panama and Grenada as 
incidents with generalizable normative force.
The foregoing paragraph was meant to place what follows in
context. The arguments for a "force of judgment" paradigm over
a ' 'judgment by force" paradigm will have to be left for the future.
For the moment, my purpose, as indicated in the opening para-
graph, is in some respects a positivistic one, namely, tracking thejustifications used in the , Nicaragua
and Panama to detennine the extent to which the promotion of
democracy constituted an opinio juris (to use a
traditional concept). With respect to each, I will 
general behaviour of the u.s. with 
countries up until the point at which democracy promotion became
one justification for forcible intervention in the 
(especially sections "The 
Enhancing Security Through Law and Institutions
II The 
, in the explicit
judgment of the community, the usurpation of democracy is intimately tied
to the attual or imminent 
rights to the degree that the general doctrine of 
intervention would be appiicable. These , in fact
forceful imposition of democracy per se even multilateral, would not be
pefmissible.
12 A 
taken with respect to the Panama invasion and also the current Haiti crisis
where the possibility of military force is coyly not denied.
13 Amato supra (second opening quotation), 516, who sees them
in these tenns despite overwhelming condemnation in both the OAS and UN.
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provide a background story of the sort important for my view that
interpretation of use of 
be conducted in the abstract but must be located.in a "historical con-
textualism 14 I will text of the inter-
ventions in Grenada, Nicaragua and Panama was, to an important
extent, a force-for-(electoral)-democracy discourse which lines up
quite closely with some of the kinds of arguments being presented
in an academic context with respect to using force for democracy
promotion by leading "realist" international lawyers based in the
United States. It will also be briefly argued why these arguments
cannot be treated as merely academic. These rationales put forward
at various levels of rhetoric by the United 
mentators will be juxtaposed to the "classicist" opinion of the ICJ
majority in the Nicaragua Case.
II. 
A. GRENADA
The United States had already taken a hostile stance toward Grenada
after the 
New Jewel Movement (NJM) and before Bishop s own overthrow
by an NJM 
14 Again
, this theme cannot be developed in this paper.
15 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), (1986) I.C.J. Rep. 14 (Merits)
reproduced at (1986) 25 I.L.M. 1025 (hereinafter Nicaragua case). For com-
mentaries on the case that deal with the issue of the use of force to promote
democracy particularly and human rights more generally, see N. S. Radley,
Human Rights and 
World Court" (1989) 38 I.C.L.Q. 321; F. R. Teson
, "
Le peuple, c est moi!
The World Court and Human Rights" (1987) 81 AITL 173; F. R. Teson
Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and (Dobbs Ferry,
New York: Transnational Publishers , 1988), especially c. 9
, "
Human Rights
and Humanitarian Intervention in the World Court: The Nicaragua Deci-
sion , The "realist" - classicist" categories are those productively employed
by T. Farer in "Human Rights in Law s Empire: The Jurisprudence War
(1991) 85 AJIL 117.
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by the Reagan Administration in terms of rebuffing the advance
of , within the United States, was "publicly
portrayed as a policy of promoting democracy
16 When the
Coard-Austin faction overthrew Bishop and had him and close
associates killed, the U.S. diverted a Lebanon-bound marine troop
ship to Grenada and invaded. Several hundred "advisers"17 stayed
on for a year to oversee a 
the island of New Jewel Movement influence. 18 u.S. -supervised
elections were held in which the u.S. preferred candidate won a
landslide victory; the CIA covertly funnelled $675 000 (a lot of
money in a small 19 If the
populace s vote was also influenced by prospects of American aid
it is worth noting that an initial $48 million 
16 Carothers
supra note 4 at 104. The 
squarely within the Re~gan Doctrine: see J. J. Kirkpatrick and A. Gerson
The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights and International Law" in L. Henkin
et al. , Right v. Might: International Law and the Use (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations , 1989) at 19-37. Kirkpatrick and Gerson insist
that the Reagan Doctrine was not a flips ide of the 
it did not call for forcible institution of liberal except
by way of the result of counter- intervention to support those who were
resisting governments who were receiving military and other assistance
from the Soviet or Cubans. Henkin s portrayal of the Doctrine as being in
essence about overthrowing "pro-communist" regimes is consistent with the
Kirkpatrick and Gerson version to the extent that political orientation was
invariably treated in the paranoid White House as the litmus test for whether
there was a Soviet intervention that needed to be countered: L. Henkin
, "
The
Use afForce: Law and U.S. Policy" in Henkin etal. , Right v. Might, ibid. 37.
17 
, "
Letter from the Legal Adviser, United States Dept. of
State" (1984) 18 Int' l Lawyer 381. This letter was written in reply to the
Committee on Grenada (E. Gordon, R. Bilder, A. Ravine , D. Wallace),
International Law and the United States Action in Grenada: A Report"
(1984) 18 Int'l Lawyer 331.
18 Carothers
supra note 4 at 105 , citing the book by Watergate-exposing
journalist Bob Woodward Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987
(New York: Pocket Books , 1987) at 337.
19 Carothers ibid.
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political reconstruction" dropped dramatically to a mere $200 000for the two years after the invasion combined.
B. NICARAGUA
The basic contours ofthe Nicaragua story are familiar to most inter-
national lawyers in this hemisphere. 
consists of the many decades of US. intervention in and control of
Nicaraguan affairs; the early years of multiple marine landings gave
way to solid support for the Somoza dynasty. This support was only
withdrawn near the very end of the Nicaraguan 
the US. helped 
' resolution
on June 23, 1979, which 
government and called for installation of a 
representative of all of the groups opposing Somoza; this govern-
ment would then be expected to hold as soon as pos-
sible 21 The 
(amongst whose ranks were the Sandinistas or FSLN) responded
positively on July 12 , 1979, and in a telegram to the OAS "ratified"
some ofthe goals which had "inspired their government"
, includingthe plan to call free elections.
Not many years passed before the US. became the bankroller
and logistical mind behind the 
contras who were waging a brutal
and costly war against the Sandinista government. Especially from
the mid-1980s onward
, in order to justify the 
contra aid, the US.(the White House and then 
1979 , OAS Foreign Ministers resolution as the "formal basis for
the removal of the 
20 Carothers
ibid. at 121 , n. 31.
21 
Nicaragua Case
, supra note 15 , para. 167. The U. S. proposed, but failedto get endorsement for, an OAS "peacekeeping" force in 1979: Whitehead
supra note 2 at 231. It had succeeded in 1965 in having the OAS endorse its
intervention in the Dominican Republic.
22 
Nicaragua Case, ibid.
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Government of 23 In 
distinguishable political and legal discourses
, the Sandinistas were
alleged to have 
, 1979, democratic
commitment. 
elections had been held in 
observers had pronounced fair and sufficiently representative of the
popular will; in the face of this evidence, the u.s. 
fairness of the elections and often pointed to the fact that several
opposition parties had removed themselves from the campaign (at
no small urging from the U.S. which actively tried to thwart the
elections ). A half 
followed, as did stalwart attempts of various Latin American states
through the Contadora process to peacefully resolve the Nicaraguan
situation and, indeed, problems throughout the Central American
region. The 1984 elections were treated as either fraudulent or vir-
tually a 
Nicaragua is referred to as undemocratic prior to the elections of
1990 supervised by the massiveUN-OAS-Carter Center election-
observing troika; sometimes this assumption was clearly grounded
in a stance taken on human rights abuses in Nicaragua
, including the
state of martial law in force for much of the period
, as opposed to
being based on a rejection ofthe 1984 
The 1990 elections (presidential, national assembly and muni-
cipal) emerged from the Contadora process after it was quite clear
that U.S. aid for the contras was going to end or tail off sharply,
in the wake of the democratic 
as the Iran-Contra affair) which the Administration had wrought in
the United States itself. External pressure from the U.S. through its
23 fmding" by Congress of July 29, 1985 cited and discussed in
Nicaragua Case, ibid. para. 168.24 
, the focus of arguments from the Administration was
on the interdiction of the flow of anns to EI Salvador rebels from Nicaragua
which was with little doubt occurring: Whitehead
supra note 2 at 232-233.
This was tied to intervention-against-communism Reagan
Doctrine.
Whitehead ibid. at 233: the U.S. knew Sandinistas would probably win.
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low-attrition war and 
to the calling of the elections and
, more significantly, was also an
omnipresent factor in voters
' calculus as to whether to vote for the
ruling Sandinistas or
, as it turns out, the winning, U.S. backed UNOcoalition. 26 
were almost immaculately conducted. 27 
26 UNO 
party coalition) won around 60% of the vote while theSandinistas polled close to 40%. The U.S. appropriated large sums of moneyto support the UNO campaign, although a significant proportion of it may not
have got to UNO in time to be put to use in the campaign.
27 It 
, however, that there are deeper considerations with
respect to an election s fairness than the fonnal fairness of the registration
voting and counting process - for instance Sandinista control of the media
on the one hand
, and U.S. coercion, on the other hand. On the need for a non-fonnalistic view of 
Human Rights Law Group, 
Guidelines for International Election (Washington, D. : IHRLG, 1984) (prepared by LaITy Garber). This relates
' directly to the problem with developing an intervention doctrine based on
a fonnalistic concept of 
Thomas Carothers
' analysis of the Reagan years emphasizes the fonnalistic
conception of democracy which the United States sought to vindicate in Latin
America, and indeed which has motivated various waves of official attention
to Latin American democracy in Washington:
(T)he Reagan administration held that a country is a democracy when
it has a government that came to power through reasonably free and fair
elections... The elections-oriented conception of democracy... ignores the
crucial question of how much real authority a particular elected govern-
ment has - whether
, for example, an elected government's authority is
curtailed in practice by the military, the economic elite
, or other powersectors. Additionally, it gives drastically short shrift to the issue of the
kinds and degree of political participation that exist within the country
in question... The remarkable endurance of the institutional configuration
of U.S. democracy leads Americans to equate the U.
S. version of demo-cracy with the idea of democracy itself and to believe that if a country
adopted U.
-style fonns of government it has become a democracy. 
To the extent the United States has supported democratic 
Latin America in this century, it has generally done so as a way of
relieving pressure for more radical political and economic change. The
impulse to promote democracy thus has a built-
in tension: the impulse
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be explained in terms of Sandinista hubris and must at least in part
cast doubt on the United States ' insistence that the Sandinistas were
not at all democratically inclined. 
C. PANAMA
Although possessing its own 
presence ofthe Panama Canal), the story ofU.S. Panama relations
are not unlike those with Nicaragua. 29 In 
, it is
important to note that presidential elections in 1984 were rigged (as
attested by international election observers ) with "the head ofthe
electoral tribunal resign(ingJ rather than certify(ingJ the results
which were imposed by the National Guard under the direction of
General Noriega ; the U.S. did not protest and, indeed, it appears
had a role in selecting the winning presidential candidate.3! A year
is to promote 
maintain the basic order of what, historically at least, are quite undemo-
cratic societies. The United States mitigates this tension by promoting
very limited, top7down fonns of 
snowballing into uncontrollable populist movements.
Carothers supra note 4 at 117- 118.
28 Whitehead
supra note 2 at 235.29 
to rights that should be protected in a proposed treaty with Panama: "
should be given direct control over elections
, so as to permit us, should
we desire, to intervene and detennine who is fairly elected.
" Quoted inWhitehead ibid. at 226.
30 Whitehead
ibid. at 228. Npne were from national organizations like the
OAS and UN. This phenomenon; crucial to any post-Cold War vision of the
world, did not begin until the later 1980s. International election observing
was pioneered by the NGO based
International Human Rights Law Group: IHRLG Guidelines , supra note 27.
31 Whitehead
ibid. at 228. For a non-committal view on whether there
was proven fraud in the 1984 election results
, see the "bipartisan" NationalRepublican Institute for 
Institute for International Affairs The May , 1989 Panamanian Elections
(1989) at 17- 18 (Foreword by Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford).
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later, after the fraudulently-elected president had tried, it appears , to
assert some independent civilian authority, 
and, for four years, a series of nominal presidents held office with
Noriega as the power behind the throne. This state of affairs , no less
than the 1984 election, was more than tolerated in Washington who
had for years been paying 
intelligence source, as a supporter of the U.S. military 
in Panama and, it seems, also for assistance to the Nicaragu,an
contras.
It was only when Noriega began to become a pubiic relations
liability of a large order, capped off by grand jury indictments in
Florida courts (which the Administration had not itself initiated),
that economic pressure and a high rhetorical war ensued to try
to oust Noriega from his position, although the Administration
was not trying to change the Panamanian military s long-standing
domination of Panamanian politicallife 34 
damage, economic 
Noriega who, in May 1989, orchestrated an even more clearly
, fraudulent election (than that of 1984) which international election
observers, including the team co-led by former U.S. President
Jimmy Carter, pronounced had actually been won by Guillermo
Endarra.35 The 
32 
Franco alleged to have been killed on Noriega s orders: NRIIA and NDlIA
ibid. at 18. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights subsequently
found Panama responsible under the American Convention on Human Rights
for Spadafora s torture-murder: Resolution No. 25/87 , Case 9726 (panama),
September 23 , 1987.
33 Carothers
supra note 4 at 111.
34 Carothers ibid. at 112.
35 NRIIA 
supra note 31. Note that the OAS did not have its
own mission in Panama, but, after receiving a letter from Carter about the
stolen election, its Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers adopted a
resolution which condemned the election fraud and authorized a conciliation
mission to seek to achieve a 
exhort(ing) all states to refrain from any 
. ,
. I
: ~. ~
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government. Seven months later, the U.S invaded, employing
what one TV commentator referred to as the largest S. W.A. T. team
in history, eventually "arrested" Noriega (spiriting him back to
Florida to face drug charges in a domestic United States court) and
facilitated the assumption of power by the Endarra government.
III. PRo-DEMOCRATIC JUSTIFICATIONS?
A. THE NORMATIVE 
STATES
The above descriptions are crucial for understanding the context in
which any responsible observer has to consider any claimed inter-
national legal right tQ use military force to promote democracy in
Latin America, or, I would argue, in similar contexts in which there
are unequal relationships between societies (for example, France
in Afiica or India in South Asia). An equally important foundation
to be laid is that of the normative discourse relating to the use of
force in the three contexts. Each situation is 
sub-text of democratic justification although the 
fication which the U.S. 
consumption seemed to rely on more , with
the possible exception of Panama.
Grenada
In Grenada, the U.S. officially presented three grounds which were
said, in combination, to justifY the intervention in all its facets:
(1) invitation from the Governor General of Grenada, (2) rescue of
U.S. nationals, and (3) collective action of the OECS.36 Yet, there
principle of nonintervention in the : see
OENSer.F/II.21 , Doc. 8/89 , rev. , 17 May 1989 reproduced in NRIIA and
NDIIA ibid. at 123. Conciliation having failed and no further collective
action having been taken by the OAS , the United States invaded six months
later.
36 S. Dept. of State Justification for Grenada Action, U.
Digest, c. 14, Part 1 in (1984) 78 AJIL 
Robinson s letter to the Gordon Committee on Grenada supra note 17.
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is abundant evidence that the United States very publicly justified
its action in terms that suggest a 
Reagan referred to an effort "to restore order and democracy
3? At
the UN, a context in which one would 
the formal legal script, Ambassador Kirkpatrick in part justified
the invasion in terms of a 
human rights
rationale.
2. 
As for Nicaragua, the democracy rhetoric (interwoven with coun-
terinterveritionist Reagan Doctrine) was front row and centre 
domestic political discourse in the United States
, especially when
it came time to contra funds each year from Congress.
It is unclear whether the U.S. justificatory discourse 
externally at the rest of the world ever 
democracy reasoning. The judicial style ofthe ICJ majority 
Nicaragua Case 
, however, extremely instructive in this regard. In
its reasons , it addressed arguments that the U.
S. might conceivably
raise , the U.S. having withdrawn from the merits phase of the case.
The Court deals at length with the argument based on the collective
self-defence (of E1 Salvador) which was clearly the U.S.' main
prong of legal , the Court then 
what possible arguments for use of force could be derived from
the above-mentioned 1985 U.S. Congressional finding on the
situation in Nicaragua and 
claims:39 (1) pro-democratic intervention (based either on the
37 Carothers supra note 4 at 91 121 , n. 32.
38 Teson Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 15 , c. 9, "
Humanitarian
Intervention: State Practice" at 192- 194. See also Farer
supra note 15 at 122
taking the view that the Grenada sub-text was democratic self-
government
and therefore resolutions of condenmation in the OAS and the UN did not
foreclose the possibilities of 
massive human rights abuse.
39 
supra note 15, discusses these passages collectively as dealing
with "humanitarian intervention . I will break them down into three separate
arguments that the Court appeared to consider
, all of which nonetheless very
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1979 "commitment" to electoral 
references to "representative democracy" in the OAS Charter);
(2) anti-totalitarian "ideological intervention 41 (3) human
rights-motivated intervention (what might be called humanitarian
intervention "proper 42 What is 
perspective is the manner in which the Court raised each of these
arguments on its own motion only to categorically dismiss them as
possible lawful grounds for the use of force43 
and then go on
much overlapped. The International Court of Justice itself did not employ the
specific tenn "humanitarian intervention
40 Nicaragua Case, supra note 15 , paras. 257-262.
41 Ibid. paras. 263-266.
42 Ibid. paras. 267-268.43 
Re. claim (1):
(E)ven supposing that such a political pledge (to representative demo-
cracy in Art. 3(d) of the OAS Charter) had had the force of a legal
commitment...and even supposing that the United States were entitled
to act in lieu of the Organization, it could hardly make use for the
purpose of methods which the Organization could not use itself; in
particular, it could not be.authorized to use force in that event. Of its
nature, a commitment like this is one of a category which, if violated
cannot justify the use of force against a sovereign State. (para 262).
It should be said that the fmding of the Court that Art. 3( 
political" not "legal" commitment appears particularly fonnalistic. Indeed
given that it falls into a Chapter styled "Principles , this may indirectly cast
some doubt on the "legal" status of the Art. 2(4) use of force prohibition
in the UN Charter which is also'found in a Chapter styled " Purposes and
Principles . Here, I prefer the interpretatIon of Judge Schwebel in dissent
who viewed Art. 3(d) as containing a legal commitment which he did not
seem to suggest, to his credit, yielded anything more than a right to (verbally)
demand changes based on that commitment. In the Court' s favour (only
slightly) is the fact that s Chapter is entitled
Fund~ental Rights " and contains furthermore specific
enunciations of the basic "Principles , including with respect to the use of
force (e.g. Art. IS). Such a further specification does not occur in the UN
Charter.
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to draw attention to the fact that these were not
, in any case, among
the legal arguments advanced by theU. 44 
Re. (2):
The Court cannot contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a
right of intervention by one State against another on the ground that the
latter has opted for some particular ideology or political system. (para
263)
Re. (3):
In any event, while the United States might fonn its own appraisal of the
situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua
, the use of force
could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect.
With regard to the steps actually taken
, the protection of human rights
a strictly humanitarian objective, cannot be compatible with the mining
of ports, the destruction of oil installations
, or again the training, anning .
and equipping of the contras. (para 268).
The concern with this paper in effect is the force-
for - democracy
argument rejected by the Court, that is claim (1). It should be evident that
nothing turns on my s view that the Art. 
commitment is merely "political". In my view
, "
representative democracy
should be viewed as a fundamental legal pillar of the American system - at
the same time as the other provisions in the GAS Charter which categorically
preclude the use of force except for reasons of classical self-defence from
external attack. I will not be directly 
pretation of the Charter text, except to make the following observation. If one
takes a text at all seriously (and original intention only a little seriously), the
fact that representative democracy has such a prominent place in the OAS
Charter at the same time as the prohibition on the use of force (except in self-
defence) makes a "force-far-democracy" argument virtually unsustainable.
44 Re 
The Court also notes that these justifications
, advanced solely in a
political context which is naturally not for the Court to appraise
, were
not advanced as legal 
confined itself to the classic argument of self-defence. ... The Court is
not entitled to ascribe to states legal views which they do not themselves
fonnulate. (para. 266)
Such ascription of views is, of course, exactly what the Court had been doing
in four long paragraphs before expressing this law-versus-politics caveat.
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is that the Court, recognizing the fluidity of the 
normative process 
compelled to address (and nip in the bud) arguments which were
threatening to break out as a full-blown legal discourse, even ifthey
were being advanced primarily for domestic political purposes. The
bottom line is that, throughout, the Nicaraguan ordeal; there were
democracy-based arguments for the use of force inhabiting one of
those intractable middle grounds between law and politics. In a
sense, the Court took judicial notice of this and attempted to put
Also reo version (3):
The Court concludes that the argument derived from the preservatibn 
human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the
conduct ofthe United States, and cannot in any event be reconciled with
the legal strategy of the respondent state, which is based on the right of
collective self-defence. (para 268)
It is interesting, however, that the Court did not explicitly make such
caveats with respect to version (1), perhaps implicitly suggesting that the U.
could be interpreted to have been advancing a legal argument that it had the
right to use force to enforce the various alleged legal commitments made by
Nicaragua. Importantly, this is the area of most relevance to the force-for-
democracy debate and the current Haiti crisis, revolving as it does around the
re-energized OAS commitment to representative democracy.
That being said, one can over-emphasize the significance of the fact that
the Court did not lodge a specific "political-not-Iegal" caveat in its discussion
of version (1). Earlier in the judgment, the Court had stated in what seemed
to be quite general terms that any rights of intervention asserted by the U.
were "statements of international policy, and not an assertion of rules 
existing international law" (para. 207) and that "the United States has, on the
legal plane, justified its intervention expressly and solely by reference to the
classic ' rules involved , namely, collective self-defence against an anned
attack" (para. 208). These comments were made by the Court in evaluating
a potential rule of law which would allow external intervention to support
(politically and morally worthy) opposition forces in non-decolonization
co..ntexts. While 
rights and democratic values (i. e. not necessarily through the medium of
internal opposition forces), there should still seem to be an implicit overlap
between the Court' s discussion at paras. 206 to 209 and that at paras. 257 to269. 
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paid to the discourse or, perhaps, contribute to the 
arguments that opponents of using force for 
employ.
Panama
Finally, with respect to Panama, the most recent intervention, I
would submit that the force-for-democracy claim began to take
on normatively-confident airs. The State Department put forward
four justifications, phrased as "objectives
The United States ' objectives were: (1) to protect American lives;
(2) to assist the lawfully and 
in Panama in 
and arrest General Noriega, an indicted drug trafficker; and (4)
to defend the integrity of United States rights under the Panama
Canal treaties.
In his speech to the nation on December 20, 1990, President Bush
used somewhat more colloquial language about defending or restor-
ing democracy as being one of the four objectives;46 
all major public statements by the President was the "restoring or
defending democracy" rationale. This is the closest yet to a direct
force-for-democracy rationale that I know of in the post-Charter
era.
It should be noted that, ifthe four "objectives" are indeed to be
understood as legal justifications, objective two was phrased in
terms that approximate the kind of invitation rationale we have seen
u.s. Digest, c. 14, Part 1 (1990) 84 AJIL 595.
Ibid.47 
, in 1983 after the Grenada
inv~ion, the State Department went out of its way to state that "humanitarian
intervention" was not one of the three justifications for the Grenada invasion:
S. Digest supra note 36. This is reiterated in the Robinson letter to the
Grenada Committee supra note 
Mr. Robinson had been replaced by Mr. Sofaer as Legal Adviser to the
Department of State.
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(and seen abused) so many other times, from Afghanistan to
Grenada.48 
should be noted that there was a noticeable paring-down ofthe legal
justifications in President Bush' s letters to Congress49 and 
United Nations Security Counci1.5O , two of the four initial
grounds were elevated to what look now to be the official justi-
fications. The first and penultimate paragraphs of the letter to the
Security Council read:
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations
I wish, on behalf of my governrnent, to report that United States
forces have exercised their inherent right of self-defence under inter-
national law by taking action in Panama in response to armed attacks
by forces under the direction of Manuel Noriega. As President Bush
stated this morning, this United States action is designed to protect
American lives and our obligations to defend the integrity of the
Panama Canal treaties. 
...
United States forces will use only the force necessary to assure the
safety of Americans and integrity of the Panama Canal treaties. 
All
feasible measures have been taken to minimize the risk of civilian
damage or casualties.
Of course, if force- for-democracy is not in fact an Article 51 argu-
ment but an interpretive gap in the Articll:! 2(4) 
use of force, then arguably the Security Council letter (required by
Article 51) leaves it open; however, the letter to 
isolates only these two grounds. Yet, the democracy rationale still
48 I approximate" because it seems clear that no such "official"
invitation was received, hor is it President
Endarra would not wish to be S. military
assistance.
S. Digest supra note 45.
Ibid.
51 
, "
Letter Dated 20 December 1989 from
the Pennanent Representative of the United States of America to the United
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council" , UN Doc.
S/21035 (emphasis added).
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does not disappear from the United States
' justificatory 
While both letters do drop completely the 
right to "arrest" Noriega in order to bring him to trial in the United
States , each still keeps the democracy question as part of the norm-
ative background by (tJhe United 
undertook this action after consultation with the democratically-
elected leaders of Panama" (the Security Council letter) and that
(the action J was welcomed by the 
ment of Panama" (the letter to Congress).
It may eventually be that the combined get-Noriega-and-save-
democracy claim will simply be seen to piggyback on the two other
(supposedly) legal grounds. But also possible is that the Noriega
grab may also be tied to and justified by a new conception of demo-
cracy promotion that seeks , in one fell swoop, to fuse the right to
use force with respect for 
timate elected government as if it were the state for all purposes
including the right to invite outside military assistance (which right
the International Court ofJustice in 
Nicaragua explicitly recognized
as a right of states 52) and not only in cases 
government has actually taken office only to be overthrown (as with
Haiti). While the word "invitation" is noticeable by its 
in both the four-point State Department 
subsequent letters, it is clear that embedded in the emerging United
States normative discourse is an 
democracy and the consent of the legitimate political leaders. So
the possible normative move which we may be witnessing is one
that completely re-defines statehood according to evolving legi-
timacy criteria (in the GAS region
, "
representative democracy
such that states as the United States and CaIiada can purport to be
implementing the wishes of the "democratically elected govern-
ment" rather than simply going in and "installing democracy
" in
violation of "state sovereignty 53 
52 
Nicaragua Case
, supra note 15 , para. 246.53 It 
sovereignty"implies a parallel transfonnation of the scope of the right of peoples to "
self-
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would be to begin to develop other surrogates for "invitation" where
there is no election as a reference point 
nationally supervised one) or where the winners of the election are
not clear, such as presumptions of consent of the populace.
detennination . This latter transfonnation could have a profound effect on the
development of a new invitation doctrine given that there already exists
considerable nonnative support for a duty 
engaging inself-detennination struggles. Paragraph 5 of Principle (e) of the
Declaration on Principles of International 
Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter 
the United Nations provides as follows:
Every state has the duty to refrain from any 
deprives peoples referred to above in elaboration 
of their right to self-detennination and freedom and independence. In
their actions against, and resistance to , such forcible action in pursuit
of the exercise of their right to self-detennination such peoples are
entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes
and principles of the Charter.
Annex to Res. 2625 (XXV) of the UN General Assembly (24 October 1970),
reproduced in I. Brownlie , ed. Basic Documents in 3d ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press , 1983) 42 (emphasis added). Given that a duty to
give support exists for all states, this second sentence is rarely interpreted as
including a duty to give direct military intervention in support. Although
there might be no duty, it would be possible to interpret this sentence as
allowing for a discretionary power to intervene in response to a request from
a self-determination movement. Leaving aside the debatable legal status and
uncertain scope of paragraph 5 as well as the traditional understanding that
it is premised on a rather narrow "colonial" definition of the right of self-
detennination, the more enthusiastic advocates of using force for democracy
might seek nonnative support by substituting an evolving meaning of "self-
determination" into this passage.54 
ex post facto judgments , we would at least
expect to continue to see, apart from anecdotal media accounts , the "public
opinion polling" of the population such as occurred 
Panama to demonstrate the ecstasy of the population at being liberated. Such
is also implicitly the way in which the 
viewed in establishment quarters in the U.S. - as a vindication of the use of
military might to force a consultation of the populace.
: ,
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Prom a Canadian perspective, it is significant that our Prime
Minister seems to have moved 
for-democracy discourse. "The Prime Minister was advised of the
American action early this morning through a phone call from
President Bush."55 arly morning wake-up call
, it would
seem, from an outside observer s perspective, that the Department
of External Affairs had to fashion a position to meet the com-
mitment of support that the Prime Minister had already given the
President. 56 The 
sympathy for the United States ' action (how more Canadian can you
get?). While putting most emphasis on the threat to American lives
democracy was the subject of two of the five paragraphs. Later, in
the House of Commons , Secretary of State Clark seemed to hone
the legal argument along the same lines as seems to have occurred
south of the border in the formal letters to the Security Council and
to Congress , by referring to the Panama Canal treaty and the threat 
to U. S. citizens as the "unique" factors which justified intervention.
Despite the "uniqueness" ofthe case, Canada "unswervingly
" sup-
ported the principle of non-intervention. But, the democratic subtext
was without doubt very much part of the support Canada gave the
United States - Canada along with Great Britain and 
the only other states to vote against UN and GAS resolutions con-
demning the invasion. 
B. ACADEMIC 
As already mentioned in passing several times , leading academic
commentators are fashioning interpretations of UN Charter Article
2(4) that allow force for , at least, force against
55 , Secretary of State for External Affairs, December
, 20, 1989.
56 s intuitions, the fact that he did not even
give a reply conditional on a legal opinion from the Department of External
Affairs is disturbing for anyone even mildly afflicted by the rule-of-
Iaw bug.
57 "Panama
" ,
(Oct.-Dec. 1989) Canadian International Relations Chronicle
29.
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tyranny. To this point, I have referred interchangeably to two of
them, D' Amato and Reisman, whose quoted views open this paper
but for purposes of this presentation I wi1llimit myself to Reisman
whose arguments are directed specifically at using force for demo-
cracy and are also very convincingly argued given his premises. 
58 
not arguing for the right to impose (or defend
by intervention) any form of government, including any principle that permits
intervention to impose a democratic form of government: "(T)he question we
should ask is not what intervention is for but what it is against. I argue that
human rights law demands intervention against tyranny : D' Amato supra
(second opening quotation), 519. To be fair to D' Amato s views , he does
seem to wish to be able to judge all forms of governance by human rights
standards which at least allows him to 
democracy can be a thin veneer for all kinds of tyrannical 
Guatemala and El Salvador). Accordingly, it would seem that he declines to
put lack (or stealing) of elections alone in the camp of the kinds of human
rights violations which would trigger the right to intervene. While I will take
D' Amato at his word, I remain dubious that there is any real distinction
between "intervention against tyranny" and " intervention for democracy
when, in situations like Panama, in large measure the context for determining
that "tyranny" has occurred is the fact of active usurpation of the democratic
vote. Teson, concerned to respect as much as he can the majority decision
in the Nicaragua Case decides not to follow Reisman all the way down
the path suggested in Reisman s 1984 article (Reisman
, "
Coercion and Self-
Determination supra note 1) which advocated using force to promote
internal self-detennin~tion" (read, democracy) and seems to be willing to
draw a bright-line (against intervention) where democracy per se is the only
motivation. He argues in Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 15 at 238:
, (T)he use of force 
portionate to the evil that it is designed to suppress. Indeed, denying
political participation is less serious , and therefore less disrespectful in
the Kantian sense, than the violation of more basic civil and political
rights. Alternative, non-forcible means of pressure should therefore be
, attempted.
He goes on to explain at page 238 why, in his view, Grenada cannot be
reduced to pro-democratic intervention because "in Grenada the new rulers
had unmistakably established the . incipient foundations of a totalitarian
dictatorship
" .
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In two editorial articles in the American Journal 
Law, Michael Reisman has presented the case for using force for
democrat~c promotion. , his goal was to focus on the text
of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and argue that it should not be
interpreted to prevent a general prohibition on the unilateral use of
force by states. In the absence of effective collective security mech-
anisms in the UN Charter, states must be allowed to unilaterally
advance community goals , at the pinnacle of which he places the
principle of self-determination ("the ongoing rights of peoples to
determine their own political destines ) understood as including
an internal , or democratic, dimension. He calls for a contextualized
evaluation of each 
advances or undermines this 
immediately after the Grenada invasion as this article did, it can be
viewed as an implicit defence ofthat action, and indeed was read as
such by Oscar Schachter in his cutting critique in reply.
Six years later, the backdrop for anew Reisman comment is the
breakdown of the Cold War in the 
Panama invasion.61 This time, rather than simply 
determination (in all its facets) as being at the pinnacle ofthe world
order system, he describes the development of a new conception of
sovereignty: "Although the venerable term ' sovereignty ' continues
to be used in international legal practice, its referent in modern
international law is quite different. International law still protects
sovereignty, but - not surprisingly - it is the people s sovereignty
59 Reisman
, "
Coercion and Self-Determination supra note 1; Reisman
Sovereignty and Human Rights supra (fIrst opening quotation). See as
well his editorial: W. M. Reisman
, "
International Law after the Cold War
(1990) 84 AJIL 859.
60 Schachter
, "
Prodemocratic Invasion supra note 1.61 
the archaic attempt in the GAS of the Panamanian 
state sovereignty" against the "popular sovereignty" stolen in the fraudulent
elections by Noriega: see Reisman supra (fIrst opening quotation), n. 22.
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rather than the sovereign s sovereignty.
"62 He 
on the development of 
missions mounted by the UN and OAS as the culmination of this
trend toward the piercing ofthe classical ("monarchical and elitist"
sovereign veil. He sees them (correctly, I would contend) as a new
institution for constitutive recognition and, by way of corollary, the
basis for withholding of recognition (much like as in Rhodesia
where the issue was minority discriminatory rule not democracy
per se). However, importantly for our purposes, he also sees the
evaluations of such missions as providing the crucial proof of the
popular will which can then be used to justify intervention from
outside; without such evidence, the invader might well be sup-
pressing the popular will no differently than the perceived internal
usurper ofpower.
Consistently with his New Haven School approach, he notes
that all kinds of contextual considerations may argue against inter-
vention, although the central point is that one of them definitively
is not some concern with a more classical notion of sovereignty.
Infringement of this conception of sovereignty can 
factored out ofthe contextual calculus.
64 
Ibid. at 869.
63 stables" of
leaders waiting in the wings to be promoted, and cites the Soviets for this
practice. In a context in which the use of force is American force, it is telling
that Reisman does not give any examples of such an historical or potential
practice in this hemisphere.
64 s views, it should be mentioned that
, too, appeals to contextualization. His contextual analysis seems to revolve
around proportionality. He argues tpat if the U.S. had used greater military
might, fewer Panamanians would have been killed. In this kind offramework
the use of the military becomes subject to debates about how effective the
force would be or was. This is a discourse which seems to be cousin to the
smart bomb" mentality that 
D' Amato would give some weight in his contextual calculus to allowing the
military to experiment a little for effectiveness in real, live conditions , so that
they will know more for "next time . This is not an academic point. Stealth
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factors that would be valid to consider 65 he is 
This is not to say that every externally motivated action to remove
an unpopular government is now permitted, or that officer corps that
feel obsoles.cence hard upon them can claim a new raison d' etre
and start scouring the globe for opportunities for "democratizing
interventions. 
Further on, he discusses the 
election observation (lEO) missions for the kind of 
evaluations he encourages decision-makers to make. On the one
hand, as already suggested, such lEO missions "contain" (counter-
balance) the systemic instability created by conditioning various
areas of international law (here, use of force doctrine) to human
rights and democracy-based contextualizations; the stabilizing effect
occurs because lEO credibly and unequivocally
indicate the wishes of a majority of the people 67 On 
hand, Reisman acknowledges the ambiguity of this indicator and
implicitly cautions against overreliance on it:
When the internationally supervised elections result in an absence
of consensus on who should govern or the integrity ofthe elections
is doubtful or there have been no elections or a civil insurrection
fighter bombers were used in Panama for no apparent purpose other than to
test features (bombing accuracy) unrelated to their primary purpose (evading
detection): see N. Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, (New York: Verso , 1991)at 166. 65 the contingencies allegedly justifying the unilateral use, the
availability of feasible persuasive alternatives , the means of coercion selected
the level of coercion used (the classic test of necessity and proportionality),
whether the objectives of the intervener include internationally illicit aims
the aggregate consequences of inaction and the aggregate consequences of
action . Earlier, he also states that "(cJross-border military actions should
certainly never be extolled, for they are necessarily brutal and destructive of
, life and property" . If one were charitable, this might be interpreted as a kind
of presumption against military force which would be 
contextual factor he refers to as "the means of coercion selected"
Reisman supra (first opening quotation) at 871.
Ibid.
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has left diverse groups vying for power
, no one can be sure that the
unilateral intervener from the 
wishes. ... In pz:actice, there may be a factual ' grey ' area between
unequivocal expressions of popular will through 
supervised 68 
, on the one hand, and
the atrocities that warrant humanitarian intervention
, on the other. '
Situations falling into the grey area will simply not lend themselves
to unilateral action
Reisman ends by noting that collectivized decision-making in cen-
tralized institutions could overcome these grey area problems
, but
returns to the theme of his 1984 article which is to argue that
, in
the transitional phase before such collective decision-making is a
reality, the attention of international lawyers should be directed to
establishing and, developing contextual democratic and human
rights-based criteria for unilateral action 69 including 
force. To Reisman, waiting for multilateralism is an abdication of
moral and (it would seem) professional responsibility "(b Jecause
rights without remedies are not rights at all"
C. THE 
BOTHER?
I have attempted to demonstrate the development of a use of force
discourse around United States actions in Central America and the
, Caribbean Basin which draws some sustenance from the idea of
promoting democracy; at least one influential scholar is articulating
a similar discourse. One commentator has sought solace in the fact
that humanitarian intervention "has been a doctrine defended in
recent years by commentators, rather than states 71 It is 
United States, In its Qfficial justifications, has shied away from
unequivocally putting forward democratic self-determination (or
Ibid.69 
methods for assessing popular will and making judgments
about divergences ibid. at 875-876.
70 
Ibid. at 875.
Radley, supra note 15 at 332.
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even other kinds of humanitarian considerations) as legal bases for
using force against Panama or Grenada or even 
lurking in the background has always been the democracy rationale
which has been played up for domestic consumption 
pure legal arguments have been pared down somewhat for interna-
tional consumption.
It may 
practice does have the rhetorical effect of strengthening the asserted
legal prohibitions on unilateral pro-democratic intervention, and this
is not to be undervalued. I take quite seriously the particular con-
ception of international law, advocated most eloquently by Oscar
Schachter, according to which one must take at face value the legal
justifications offered by states for their actions in order 
ize them.72 A 
reasons (say, just for example, a police action to 
dealer) but justifies its action in terms of self-defence or some other
more-or-Iess accepted ground, that state both 
scrutiny of how the 
and helps
strengthen the normative force of the basic rule to which the state
has declined to seek an exception.73 As 
seems to me unhelpful (to put it mildly) to try to 
manageable sense of an international normative order in the way
D' Amato wishes to , that is by privileging what states actually "
whatever they may "say . 74 It 
Schachter
, "
Self-Defense supra note 11.
Ibid.74 
supra (the opening quotation) as an example of this
theory oflaw which D' Amato 
By and large, his view has been directed at the identification of custom but
has clearly been extended to the realm of treaty interpretation in a way which
goes beyond either evolutionary or purposive interpretation by, in effect
ignoring textual language because of illicit (i. e. classical sovereignist)
motives underlying the text. Presumably, D' 
motives had only become illicit (so as to allow departure from the text) with
the passage oftime and the corresponding gradual incursion of human rights
values into classical sovereignty doctrine. 
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of claims are articulated self-consciously by state actors and self-
consciously responded to by other state actors if one is interested in
making internati(;mallaw as transparent as possibIe.and in forging
a relatively autonomous discourse in international relations. One
cannot simply dismiss out of hand the fact that the vast majority of
states , in the General Assemblies of the UN and OAS, condemned
in very strong language the Grenada 
(especially Panama). Perhaps the biggest concern of all in 
regard is the implicit "gunman" theory oflaw in D' Amato s doing-
over-saying theory. If all that most states can " " is protest the
military adventures of a powerful state while that powerful state
can actually-physically " " the invasion, then that incident (not
encountered by physical actions of some sort 
states ' conviction that this act is illegal) becomes norm-generating. 75
Verbal protest 
development.
Despite the foregoing, the above description ofthe parallel but
converging legal and political discourses of justification are meant
to illustrate the point that one must have a fluid enough idea of law
to see how "political" justifications are increasing the operative ones
in various places that count. In more traditional terms , one has to be '
constantly aware of the fact that state actors themselves can begin
to transform previously "political" justifications into "legal" ones. '
But, very much different from D' Amato s approach, I am only
advocating that so-called political justifications be examined to see
if they are in fact sending the message that this is how the state
actors in question are conceptualizing their act in normative terms.
In assessing the desirability of acceding to these legal claims, one
will of course have to be aware of 
what in fact is likely to go on
under the cloak of the ' claim 
that such things go on make them the law, as D' Amato would.
Rather, these are reasons why the claimed rule is desirable or not
75 (a) major customary international law develop-
ment since 1948 was the intervention by the United States in Grenada in
1983 , and a second one is the Panamanian int~rvention of 1989" : D' Amato
supra (second opening quotation) at 523.
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or reason to judge the state to be in violation of the rule (if it is in
fact recognized as existing already). Indeed
, it is in part because the
democracy claim would not be truly descriptive of what really
motivates the 
recognize it as the rule.
Ultimately, my message is that to ignore the parallel discourse
that uses non-statist paradigms to justify 
refuge in an overly rigid 
between legal and political discourse. It is significant that the initial
justification in Panama referred to democracy and subsequent justi-
fications always mentioned the restoration of the democratically-
elected government. It is also extremely significant that the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case addressed the
democracy (and human rights) justification among its list of argu-
ments which it would consider in the absence ofthe United States
arguing them on its own. I recognize that the academic debate for
many traditional lawyers, or simply lawyers not caught up in the
vortex oflegal debate in the United States, seems to be about policy
or morality or, at most, that old positivist haven of last resort lex
ferenda. In a very real sense, that is indeed what it is about. But
equally, to take solace in this fact is, in my view, to adopt a
distinctly ostrich-like perspective. If only because American legal
culture, influenced by its constitutional legal culture and many other
variables, is inclined to ideologize international law, the debates that
seem to have been myopically centred on U.S. foreign policy and
which have preoccupied many leading U.S. international lawyers
must be engaged by other international lawyers of the Americas. It
is an unstable, if not false, victory to take refuge in the fact that the
more messianic interpretations ofthe law from south of the 
are not agreed with by other state elites or the mainstream of the
interpretive community of international lawyers when the will and
the means to intervene 
namely Washington (with occasional chimes heard from Ottawa).
76 
supra note 64 at 158-163; Whitehead supra note 2 at
229.
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broader dialogue must be 
interstate dialogues taking place within the OAS
, and in the UN as
well.
A considerable chunk of international law is best thought of as
being discursive or communicative in nature and the two interacting
fields of discourse with which we are concerned here
, use of force
and democratic self-determination (combining aspects of human
rights law and statehood criteria), are perhaps the prime examples.
In such a ftamework, the line between policy, morality, law and
basic politics is fluid to say the least. We may therefore be better off
thinking in termsof"normativity" rather than law pure and simple
in terms of relative persuasiveness in a process of giving of reasons
rather than an analytical exercise oflooking to so-called sources of
law to identify what a rule is in some static and time-
crystallized sense. And even if we purport to be engaging in the
latter form of more traditional positivistic analysis
, invariably we
will also end up doing the former, by making implicit choices about
what arguments "count" more (i. e. those that count as "sources" and
thereby send that particular normative signal we label "law ) and
in any case, by using policy arguments to bolster one s arguments. 77
Allow me to be clear about one thing: it is my firm opinion
that, if one takes at all seriously the generally-accepted sources of
international law and their grounding in positivistic notions of state
sovereignty as an organizing principle ofthe international system
then state practice, high judicial opinion and relevant texts do not
support the force-for-democracy claim. But I would insist that my
own analysis, useful though it may be to persuade those who agree
with the legal paradigm I am using (or willing to use) and its funda-
mental assumptions, would be missing the point. The point is in part
that these are, normativelyspeaking, quasi -revolutionary, paradigm-
shifting times, when arguments that seem to challenge current inter-
pretive understandings can take root and grow. We are not simply
talking about' a substantive area of law in which the line between
law in the making and firm law can quickly and imperceptibly be
See Brownlie
, "
Gunmen supra note 8 , as a classic example.
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crossed. We are talking about 
fundamentals of the system itself. There was a time when various
versions of transnationalism, including the McDougal-Reisman
version, were sufficiently at odds with the 
standings that gave shape to international norms that they could be
dismissed as being unorthodox, however brilliant and 
appealing. Today, however, the notions of "post-Cold War" and
New World Order" have captured something of everyone s ima-
gination, I wager to say, and have, I would argue, fostered a kind of
value- laden boldness that is almost missionary among those who
feel their values "won" the Cold War against the Soviet bloc and are
now sweeping through the South.
The sad irony is that it was the force of ideas which ushered in
this post-'Cold War era , not the idea of force. However, ironic or
not, Professors Reisman and D'Amato will have helped persuade
those particular decision-makers whose views and actions translate
into official words and powerful deeds while those of us who resist
fusing the goal of democracy with the means of forcible imposition
will be left to sputter in protest that the ' law ' is otherwise. As it
, my intuition is that 
Reisman have already influenced (if only by creating less normative
resistance for) the United States ' hemispheric juridical foreign
policy.
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Kirkpatrick was herself an 
Reagan s attention and landed her the job as U.S. Ambassador to the UN: see
J. J. Kirkpatrick
, "
Dictators and Double Standards , (Nov. 1979) Com-
mentary 29. See also the very recent Kirkpatrick
, "
The Use of Force and the
Law of Nations" , (1991) 16 Yale J. Int'l L. 583. Michael Reisman is now the
Bush Administration s appointee to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights.
